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Abstract. Networks modeling bilaterally-cleared and centrally-cleared
derivatives markets are shown to yield economically different price im-
pact, volatility and contagion after an initial bankruptcy. A large bank-
ruptcy in bilateral markets may leave a counterparty unable to ex-
pectationally prevent bankruptcy (checkmate) or make counterparties
push markets and profit from contagion (hunting). In distress, bilateral
markets amplify systemic risk and volatility versus centralized markets
and are more subject to crises with real effects: contagion, unemploy-
ment, reduced tax revenue, higher transactions costs, lower risk sharing,
and reduced allocative efficiency. Pricing distress volatility may suggest
when to transition to central clearing. The model suggests three met-
rics for the well-connected part of a market — number of counterparties,
average risk aversion, and standard deviation of total exposure — may
characterize its fragility. (JEL: G01, G28, D49 )
Systemic crisis is a recurring theme in finance. However, different markets
have been seen to respond differently to distress. Therefore, it is important
to study how these differences in distress might arise from differences in
market structure. That is the goal of this paper.
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Over the past fifteen years, crises at Askin Capital Management, Kidder
Peabody, Long-Term Capital Management, Bear Stearns, American Inter-
national Group, and Lehman Brothers have spread beyond those firms to
affect markets and firms worldwide. Of particular interest is the epidemic
nature of these crises: trouble at one firm spreads to other firms. Therefore,
it makes sense to consider counterparty risk. In a strict sense, this is the
direct risk to an institution due to a counterparty defaulting on a contract
with that institution. In a broader sense however, we can consider how
that default affects an institution indirectly (via other counterparties) or
the overall market. Such indirect effects are often thought of as contagion
and thus counterparty risk can lead to systemic risk.
Counterparty risk might seem to be a feature of over-the-counter (OTC)
markets; however, many bonds are traded OTC without any worry of coun-
terparty risk. Derivatives might seem to create counterparty risk since they
are agreements between two parties; however, futures and options are deriva-
tives and the CME and CBOE clearinghouses have never defaulted.
Two counterexamples to the above crises illustrate the difference. Refco
was one of the largest US futures brokers when it went bankrupt due to
fraud in 2005. MF Global was one of the largest futures broker-dealers in
the US, Europe, and Australasia when it went bankrupt due to perceived
risk of bets on Eurozone debt in 2011. Such bankruptcies would seem likely
to cause anxiety among counterparties; however, the increase in volatility
around these bankruptcies was small. Academics who study markets did
not even notice Refco: there are no academic finance or economics papers
discussing the failure. In contrast, the near-bankruptcy of Bear Stearns and
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2007 caused chaos and interruptions in
many OTC markets and are still being studied
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Why were Refco’s and MF Global’s bankruptcies comparatively placid?
Part of the answer seems related to their having traded mostly futures: all
the other crises mentioned involved OTC derivatives; and, in all of those
cases the OTC markets largely ceased trading. In 1994, mortgage-backed
securities largely ceased trading leading to the failure of a hedge fund (Askin)
and the near-bankruptcy of an investment bank (Kidder Peabody). In 1998,
the interest-rate swap spread and equity index volatility markets dried up
as another large hedge fund (LTCM) failed. In 2007, the markets for credit
default swaps and collateralized debt obligations ground to a halt as Bear
Stearns nearly failed and Lehman went bankrupt. In all of these systemic
crises, however, the CME, CBOE, and other futures and options exchanges
continued to trade without interruption.1
One difference between these markets is in whether they use a central
counterparty (CCP) or not. Many derivatives exchanges (including the CME
and CBOE) use a CCP; markets for swaps, swaptions, and the other instru-
ments mentioned above do not use a CCP. Acharya, Engle, Figlewski, Lynch,
and Subrahmanyam (2009) suggest that the lack of a CCP in these markets
exacerbated the subprime financial crisis. That markets with CCPs con-
tinued trading while many markets without CCPs ceased trading suggests
counterparty risk is a feature of market structure. Specifically: differences
in network structure connecting counterparties may multiply or reduce the
systemic effects of bankruptcy.
The importance of market structure with respect to systemic risk and
contagion has been studied before, most notably by Allen and Gale (2000,
2004) and Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007). They primarily
consider the interbank market and find that well-connected networks are
1For an example of the size of positions on one major futures exchange, Melamed (2009)
gives the notional of CME contracts held at the time of these incidents as $761 billion
(Bear) and $1.15 trillion (Lehman).
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more robust to shocks and less likely to exhibit contagion than sparse net-
works. Gai and Kapadia (2010) find that conditional on contagion, however,
well-connected networks may be more fragile and yield greater destruction.
As for markets with CCPs, Duffie and Zhu (forthcoming) find that more
than one CCP may be inefficient and systemically riskier.
That market structure affects market volatility, default probabilities for
counterparties, and the likelihood and perniciousness of contagion is of cen-
tral importance to asset pricing because both volatility and default are priced
risk factors. Increased volatility or volatility-induced losses may lead people
and companies to reduce their holdings of risky instruments and, instead,
horde cash. Increased volatility may widen bid-ask spreads, raising trans-
actions costs at precisely the time when many people want to rebalance
their portfolio. Increased volatility may also trigger the execution of limit
or stop-loss orders. Further, the reducton of risky positions when they are
likely to be undervalued may lock in losses. All of these situations also lead
to allocative inefficiencies.
Systemic crisis is also important to corporate finance because volatility
affects many decisions of the firm. Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009)
model of the endogeneity of market and funding liquidity, verified by Boudt,
Paulus, and Rosenthal (2011), suggests increased volatility may trigger lower
market liquidity and thus a vicious cycle of decreasing market and funding
liquidity. This means that counterparty risk may bleed over into the funding
markets and affect non-financial businesses. This would affect firms’ capital
structures and, as a result, their taxation. Firms would also be more likely
to horde cash instead of distributing it to shareholders or reinvesting in the
firm.
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When counterparty risk induces an increase in follow-on bankruptcies, we
get contagion and systemic risk. These bankruptcies simultaneously unem-
ploy many people.2 This strains social welfare programs as those workers
apply for benefits from the state while the unemployment shock reduces
government revenue from payroll taxes and realized losses reduce corporate
tax revenues. Bernanke (1983) has shown that such effects on financial firms
may also lead to more expensive credit which affects non-financial firms and
can lead to economic contraction or even depression. Thus counterparty risk
and systemic crisis have economically significant real effects.
I use a two-period model to study the effects of a financial institution
bankruptcy in an economy with one risky asset. The approach is general
enough to be applied to any network structure and extended to multiple
periods. Thus the approach could be used to design markets which most
reduce the undesirable effects (externalities) studied here. The model is
applied to two market-based network structures which represent markets
with and without a central counterparty. Similar to Cifuentes, Ferrucci,
and Shin (2005), Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007), and Gai and
Kapadia (2010), I assume trading moves prices of the risky asset. However,
the model excludes the effects of adverse selection on price discovery. This
allows us to study differences in volatility and follow-on bankruptcies due
strictly to market structure.
For these network structures, the model suggests that a central counter-
party stabilizes the market by reducing post-bankruptcy volatility, undesired
exposure through broken contracts, and contagion (follow-on bankruptcies).
A central counterparty thus reduces systemic risk. This finding disagrees
2The effect of many people searching simultaneously for similar jobs can cause the labor
market to undergo a concurrent crisis: troubled firms reduce hiring in the face of their
own possible bankruptcy; and, stable firms wait to hire while the market price of that
available labor deflates.
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with Allen and Gale (2000) and Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn
(2007) due to their models precluding separation of buying and selling re-
hedgers post-shock.3 Our model also allows us to predict the differences in
systemic risk and distress responses between market structures for a given
initial bankruptcy. This can even be extended to characterize a market’s
susceptibility to follow-on bankruptcies (i.e. contagion or market “critical-
ity”). Thus this model implicitly suggests that reporting such data to a
market monitor is beneficial.
1. The Two-Period Network Model
The economy we study has one risky underlying asset. Financial institu-
tions (counterparties) trade OTC swaps on this asset. The only risk to the
n counterparties is that changes to the risky asset price affect the worth of
their swap contracts. The risk-free rate is assumed to be 0.
To simplify, we assume there is at most one contract between any two
counterparties. (This is akin to netting contracts between counterparties.)
The collection of counterparties and contracts defines a network: counter-
parties comprise the nodes of the network and contracts define its edges.
Counterparties are endowed with capital and risk aversion. For simplicity,
all counterparties start with the same capital K and risk aversion λ. Con-
tracts are endowed with signed sizes. These sizes may be constrained to give
the network a certain topology. Counterparties begin in equilibrium, hold-
ing their desired exposure to the risky asset, and will seek to return to this
exposure if perturbed from it. Contracts are continually marked-to-market:
All gains and losses are realized after each trade in the market. Thus any
cashflow which exceeds the remaining capital results in bankruptcy.
3The preclusion of separating buying and selling rehedgers is an artifact of their con-
structing well-connected networks from sparse networks, instead of vice versa as is done
here.
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What the exposures mean is important. While we examine only one risky
asset, a more complex world would have multiple risky assets. In that situa-
tion, we could view these exposures in two ways. If they are overall exposures
to risk, counterparties might not seek to return to equilibrium. If they are
positions in only one risky instrument, however, counterparties might hold
counterbalancing positions; in that case, returning to equilibrium might be
more natural. However, neither of these cases diminishes the seriousness of
a capital-depleting cashflow. Even a firm with a counterbalancing position
would surely see the dangers in matching the timing of such large cashflow
movements.
Each trade affects the market by moving prices. This is modeled by a
linear price impact model. For the duration of the modeled period, impact
is permanent. That impact may or may not revert after the period modeled
here. Neither of these would affect the results here. Thus one could view
this impact as a pure service fee or as a charge for the possibility of adverse
selection. A counterparty will therefore trade strategically given expected
price impact, trading costs, and variance reduction. In the extreme, we
can think of this as a no-seppuku rule: a counterparty will not rehedge
completely if that rehedging would push it into bankruptcy
Trading occurs in a random sequence within a period. Price impact im-
plies counterparties do not all rehedge at the same price. This leads to high
and low prices “during” each period as well as an increase in market volatil-
ity. These price movements may cause some of the initially-living n − 1
counterparties to go bankrupt.
All trading is done with a counterparty outside the network who has no
concerns about risk or bankruptcy. One could appeal to an influx of liquidity
providers in a crisis as justifying this approach. While it would be useful to
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have trades done with a market maker who learns and responds strategically,
this would likely obscure which effects are due solely to market structure.
The model is a two-period model with trading in periods 1 and 2. At time
t = 0, bankruptcy of the n-th counterparty occurs; n − 1 counterparties
survive. Some or all of the living counterparties may have one of their
contracts (connected edges) eliminated. At time t = 1, each counterparty
trades to maximize mean-variance utility given its desired exposure, the
volatility of the risky asset, and expectations of others’ actions. Follow-on
bankruptcies may occur in period 1. At time t = 2, all remaining exposures
due to the bankruptcy are hedged with trading again occurring in a random
order. While follow-on bankruptcies may occur in period 2, these may result
from the constraints inherent to a two-period model.
1.1. Notation. We introduce notation to express the dynamics of this model:
pt = price of the risky asset at end of period t;
rt = return of the risky asset in period t;
K = capital of each counterparty at start of period 0;
σ = volatility per period of the risky asset price; and,
qij = exposure of counterparty i via contract with counterparty j 6= i.
Worth noting is that the contract notation implies direction: qij = −qji.
The price impact model is linear in trade size so that it is as simple
as possible and arbitrage-free as per Huberman and Stanzl (2004). If we
assume price innovations are iid and have mean zero, we get the expected
price for a trade by counterparty i (absent other trading) as a function of
the quantity rehedged xi:
E(p(xi)) = p0 + pixi︸︷︷︸
permanent
.(1)
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The price p1 at the end of period 1 is:





iid∼ (0, 1). While the end-of-period price is unaffected by the
ordering of trades within the period, bankruptcies do depend on the path
of prices in a period.
1.2. Network Topologies. While any network topology could be studied,
we consider two market-based extremes. A star network with n contracts
represents a market with a central counterparty; a complete network with
n(n− 1)/2 contracts represents a bilateral OTC market. Examples for four





































Figure 1. The two network structures considered shown for
n = 4 counterparties: a star network connected via a central
counterparty (left) and a complete network (right).
The bankruptcy at t = 0 affects these two topologies in different ways. For
the star (centrally-cleared) network, the initial bankruptcy only invalidates
one contract with the central counterparty (CCP). For a complete (bilateral
OTC) network, the initial bankruptcy invalidates contracts with n−1 living
counterparties.
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2. Two-Period Analysis
With a few assumptions we can analyze the effect of the initial bankruptcy
for these two network types. Contract sizes are assumed to have a zero mean
and finite variance: qij
iid∼ (0, η2) for i < j in the complete network. The star
network has contract sizes equal to net exposures in the complete network.
Counterparty i has net exposure of Qi =
∑
j qij = qi,CCP . Net exposures
have expectation 0 and variance (n− 1)η2.
After the initial bankruptcy (t = 1), living counterparties in a star net-
work have no unwanted exposure; only the central counterparty has un-
wanted exposure to the risky asset. For a complete network, each living
counterparty i has unwanted exposure of −qin reflecting the subtraction of
the invalidated contract with the bankrupted counterparty.
Since the informational implications are different, we examine two cases:
small and large initial bankruptcies.
2.1. Small Bankruptcy. We first consider the bankruptcy of a small finan-
cial firm. The small size suggests other counterparties have less information
about the bankrupted firm. Thus bankruptcy may be due to market risk
or idiosyncratic (management-related) factors. This is manifested in the
capital at the start of period 1 being K for each living firm. The only infor-
mation living counterparties have about counterparty n’s market exposure
is their individual contracts with the bankrupted.
2.1.1. Star Network. In a star network, none of the living counterparties
has a broken contract. Therefore none of the living are directly affected by
counterparty risk nor need they rehedge. Since the living counterparties’
contracts incur no default, there is no early signal that any counterparty
has gone bankrupt.
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The central counterparty (CCP) takes on the bankrupted’s exposure at
time t = 1. If the CCP rehedges immediately, the permanent price impact
will be for a −Qn-sized trade: ∆p = −piQn.
The CCP has advantages over other counterparties: It knows all coun-
terparties’ positions and trades; and, it would have immediate evidence of
predatory trading by a living counterparty. This lets the CCP rehedge to
reduce price impact and avoid causing further bankruptcies.
Also relevant (but not in the model) are the CCP’s operating and contrac-
tual agreements. The CCP might have a contractual claim against counter-
parties if it goes bankrupt.4 The CCP can also dictate margin and mark-
to-market requirements to penalize large or risky positions. With these
agreements, living counterparties have even stronger incentives not to move
the market against the CCP. Thus while these details are outside the model,
they further justify the CCP’s trading to reduce price impact and contagion.5
Thus the CCP trades to maximize mean-variance utility:






[Q2n + (Qn + x)
2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
variance penalty
−piQn(Qn + x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
period 2 impact
(3)





Note that without price impact, the optimal policy is to rehedge com-
pletely in period 1 (xCCP = −Qn). As linear price impact pi increases,
the optimal trade tends toward an equal split of rehedging between periods
1 and 2. As volatility (σ) increases, the optimal trade tends to rehedge
completely in period 1.
4The CME clearinghouse uses such a structure.
5Further research should examine when these incentives break down and members act
against a CCP.
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2.1.2. Complete Network. In a complete network, bankruptcy by counter-
party n invalidates n − 1 contracts. Each counterparty trades to rehedge
their eliminated contract by the end of period 2. Since the bankruptcy is
small, we ignore high and low prices triggering bankruptcies.
Each living counterparty chooses xi to maximize Markowitz mean-variance
utility. This is the same as minimizing price impact (affecting exposure and
the traded amount) plus the penalized variance of the unhedged exposure
(x− qin):






[q2in + (x− qin)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
variance penalty
−piqin(qin − x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
period 2 impact
(5)
When each counterparty knows nothing about the other counterparties’





The sequencing of trades in periods 1 and 2 increases price volatility of the
risky asset. The price volatility in periods 1 and 2 comes from equation (1)
and the variation in contract sizes:
















2.2. Large Market-Induced Bankruptcy. While the bankruptcy of a
large financial firm could come from mismanagement or fraud, we consider
bankruptcies known or suspected to arise from market risk. Bankruptcies
suspected of arising from market risk are also considered because strategic
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issues in exiting a large position cast doubt on legitimate claims of misman-
agement. (Living counterparties may suspect market risk is to blame despite
legitimate claims of mismanagement.)
2.2.1. Initial Bankruptcy. To study the effect of a market-induced bank-
ruptcy, we impose an exogenous market return shock in period 0, r0, such
that bankruptcy occurs for the most exposed counterparty (labeled counter-
party n for convenience). Mathematically, this means: K+Qnr0 ≤ 0 where
Qnr0 < Qir0 for all i < n. For ease of exposition, we assume Qn is positive
and r0 is negative.
While the results are the same, we can consider two perpectives on Qn.
If living counterparties do not know Qn, they can infer it from the market
return preceding counterparty n’s bankruptcy.6 With initial capital of K,
the living counterparties estimate Qn as Qˆn = E(Qn|K+Qnr0 ≤ 0). Evalu-
ating this expectation requires weak distributional assumptions and extreme
value theory. (Appendix A.1 gives the derivation of Qˆn.) Alternately, we
can endow all living counterparties with perfect information. In that case,
they do know Qn. We then view the use of Qˆn as merely studying the most
likely scenario for a given bankruptcy-inducing market return r0.
For iid normal Qi’s, we estimate the maximum-likelihood initial large
bankruptcy exposure as:























, and κ1 is the
standardized maximum possible exposure of a living counterparty. If Qn is





6Till (2006) infers Qn, albeit using different methods.
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2.2.2. Follow-On Bankruptcies. Since the broken contract is large, trading
in periods 1 and 2 might cause follow-on bankruptcies. All broken contracts
must be (in expectation) rehedged, and counterparties’ mark-to-market pay-
ments depend on price impact and their positions subject to that impact.





n−1 and greater than κ2(Qˆf ) which depends on the market struc-
ture. (Details are in Appendix A.2.)
We can then solve for the equilibrium distress pervasiveness bˆ (the num-
ber of follow-on bankruptcies) and the distress exposure Qˆf (the exposure
annulled by follow-on bankruptcies):












where Φ and φ are the standard normal cdf and pdf.
A natural question is how sensitive follow-on bankruptcies are to an ini-
tial bankruptcy. One measure of the market’s fragility or susceptibility to
distress is the sensitivity of distress exposure,
∂Qˆf
∂Qˆn
; another measure is the
sensitivity of distress pervasiveness, ∂bˆ
∂Qˆn
.
A valid criticism of these sensitivities is that counterparties going bank-
rupt with very little exposure would require a very large drop in the price
of the risky asset — an unlikely event. To account for this, we can look at
sensitivities weighted by the likelihood of such a precipitating r0. Thus we
would examine the likelihood-weighted sensitivity of distress exposure to see
what size of initial bankruptcy is of greatest likely concern.
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2.2.3. Star Network. For a star network, only the CCP holds a broken con-
tract. Thus only the CCP learns immediately of default. While such a
default would become public knowledge quickly, the CCP also sees preda-
tory trading immediately and can punish it.
Since only the CCP must rehedge, we can ignore low prices due to rehedg-
ing volatility. The additional unwanted exposure incurred by all counter-
parties due to follow-on bankruptcies, Qˆf , then results from counterparties





n− 1(p0r0 − pi(Qˆn + Qˆf ))
.(15)
Since there are no worries about low prices and the CCP trades a fraction
of the total trade ν = pi+λσ
2
2pi+λσ2
∈ [0, 1] in period 1, we may ignore the period
1 versus 2 distinction.
2.2.4. Complete Network. In a complete network, each living counterparty
immediately detects default. Thus each living counterparty must trade to
rehedge. This not only pushes the market further; the variation in rehedging
trades also increases the volatility of the risky asset. That volatility also
creates price extremes that are likely to be greater than the trading range
from the rehedging of a CCP. A comparison of possible price paths (Figure 2)
shows the difference in range.
We should expect more follow-on bankruptcies in complete networks for
three reasons. First, extreme prices beyond the CCP rehedging price range
will result in more counterparties being (expectationally) unable to pay
mark-to-market. Second, counterparties with a small exposure will be driven
by unwanted variance and may hedge completely in period 1. Third, the
fraction of hedging in period 1 ν enters κ2 and thus the follow-on exposure
equation (14) in a way that creates a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation.
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Figure 2. Possible price paths from $30 to $24 due to re-
hedging by a centralized counterparty (left) and bilateral
OTC market participants (right).
If the overall fraction of the total rehedge traded in period 1 is ν, the over-
all impact incurred for bilateral OTC markets will have three components.
Two components, ν/2 and (1 − ν)/2, are due to the random sequence of
trading in periods 1 and 2 implying that each counterparty expects half of
the other trades in that period to occur first. The third component, (1−ν)ν,
is due to the position to be hedged in period 2 which incurs all impact of
period 1 trading. The total impact is then 12 + ν − ν2 which varies between
1/2 (ν = 0 or 1) and 3/4 (ν = 1/2). If we assume risk aversion (λ > 0), we
would hope to be able to restrict our attention to the sub-interval ν ∈ [12 , 1].
Trading by multiple counterparties with differing exposures creates high
and low prices. Since we consider rehedgers who (net) sell, we estimate the
low price and see how that effects follow-on bankruptcies. The low price is
driven by the running sum of trades. That is approximated by a Brownian
bridge, a Brownian motion tied to end at −(Qˆn + Qˆf ) and can be handled
by time inversion. (See Appendix A.3 for details.)
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Thus the expected low quantity Sn−1 of cumulated trades over trading
periods 1 and 2:
E(Sn−1|Sn−1 = −(Qˆn + Qˆf )) =
















p0r0 − piE(Sn−1|Sn−1 = −(Qˆn + Qˆf ))
.(17)
This allows us to determine Qˆf from (14).
If we were to solve the n−1-player game, we would have to solve an opti-
mization of each player’s mean-variance utility given the others’ trades. This
optimization then yields the period 1 fraction of trade ν. Initial simulations
suggest that heterogeneous rehedging needs — in particular the presence of
long and short rehedgers — can yield values of ν in excess of 1 and even of
the order ν = 1.5–2.
2.2.5. Destabilizing Phenomena. Such multi-player games reveal two phe-
nomena of interest. While one phenomenon is unfortunate, the other is
undesirable and may greatly destabilize the market. While these phenom-
ena are always possible, they may easily affect or become the equilibrium
solution in the large market-induced bankruptcy case.
The first of these phenomena is checkmate: when any action (or inaction)
by a counterparty cannot be expected to avoid bankruptcy. Checkmate is
unfortunate for the ensnared counterparty; they cannot hedge in such a way
as to expect to stay in business by the end of period 2. Since the checkmated
counterparty cannot expect to stay in business, it may be in their interest
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to do nothing in hopes of randomly avoiding period 2 bankruptcy.7 A nec-
essary condition for checkmate is that closing the position would result in
bankruptcy:
(18) −piQ2n/p0 +K < 0⇔ Qn >
√
Kp0/pi.
Proposition 1 (Checkmate). In a complete network, there is a Qn ∈ (0,∞)
such that for some k < n and any finite xk we expect bankruptcy in period
1: E(pi
∑
j<n xjQk|F1) > K −Qkr0.
What Proposition 1 means is that a large enough initial bankruptcy may
result in an expected follow-on bankruptcy in period 1 despite the best
efforts of the checkmated counterparty. This implies that policies restricting
or taxing excess leverage might reduce distress (in this case, the number
of market participants operating in checkmate). Note, however, that the
leverage ratio implying checkmate varies with 1/
√
K.
The second phenomenon is hunting : when other counterparties expect to
profit by inducing follow-on bankruptcies. This means some counterparties
act to push prices further in a particular direction to make money. Normally,
this is not possible in a market with price impact as we assume here. The
invalidation of contracts with the bankrupted counterparty, however, makes
profits possible.
Proposition 2 (Hunting). In a complete network of 3 or more counterpar-
ties, there is a Qn ∈ (0,∞) such that for all exposures of Qn or greater,
bankruptcy has a positive expected payoff for two or more other counterpar-
ties.
A sketch of the proof for n = 3 offers insight into how hunting works.
7A checkmated counterparty might even seek to become “Too Big to Fail,” in effect taking
the market hostage to seek more favorable liquidation terms.
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Proof. Assume counterparty 3 is checkmated. Let Q1, Q2 < 0 < Q3 be such
that Q1 + Q2 = −Q3. Without loss of generality, we assume q13 = Q1,
i.e. counterparties 1 and 2 have no exposure to one another. For pi > 0,
counterparties 1 and 2 trade Q1 and Q2 to replicate their counterparty 3
exposure, causing losses to counterparty 3: pi(Q1 +Q2)Q3/p0 +K < 0. Note
that the market impact of trading by counterparties 1 and 2 is expected to
bankrupt counterparty 3.
The positive expected profit from such a strategy is due to the random
ordering of trading. The first “hunter” to trade receives a mark-to-market
profit due to the second hunter’s trading. The expected profit is E(PLi) =
piQ1+Q22p0 Qi. If counterparty 3 goes bankrupt, all contracts with counterparty
3 are canceled. The exposure of the hunting counterparties reverts from 2Qi
back to Qi.
If counterparty 3 does not go bankrupt, the hunting may continue or
hunters may unwind their trades at no cost (since the market impact model
is arbitrage-free). 
2.2.6. A Separating Equilibrium? We can also examine a complete network
from another perspective. Since we have multiple players, we can expect
that there are multiple equilibria for how people would trade. One possible
equilibrium is for rehedgers to separate themselves with buyers and sellers
trading in different periods. We can see this by considering a large market
drop which induces those who are long to sell.
Since the sellers are at risk of going bankrupt, they will sell in period
1 hoping to trade at the beginning of the period and not going bankrupt.
This generates the typical “race for the exits.” However, with only sellers in
period 1, those whose sales are executed at the end of the period are likely
to go bankrupt. Meanwhile, buyers wait to trade in period 2 at the lowest
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prices after sellers have bankrupted one another and pushed the market
down.
In the extreme case, the buyers in period 2 would not even need to trade:
bankruptcies in period 1 would annul their contracts and leave them flat.
This possibility alone might support such an equilibrium.
With these sorts of dynamics, the period 2 trade is difficult to calculate.
However, the result is the maximum distress in terms of volatility, low price,
and follow-on bankruptcies. Thankfully, we can find the low price with only
the net period 1 trade (which is easier to calculate).
We can think of the trades from buyers and sellers xi as adding up to
some total trade quantity Q¯ < 0. The question then is, what is the sum of








xi = Q¯ < 0).(19)
Unfortunately, this is a difficult question to answer. We approximate the
answer by finding the expected sum of the absolute value of n− 1 standard
normal variables for a distribution with mean µ = −Q¯/((n− 1)3/2η).








xi = Q¯ < 0). =(20)
=(n− 1)3/2ηφ(−µ) + Q¯(1− Φ(−µ)).(21)
Note that the expected total sell trades scale with the 3/2 power of the
number of living counterparties (i.e. super-linearly). This suggests that such
separating equilibria become destructive faster than a market’s growth rate
and that there might be a point where bilateral OTC markets transition
from being robust to distress to being fragile.
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3. Examples
To get an idea of what different bankruptcies look like, we consider a
market with n = 10 counterparties, each having capital K of $1 million.
Note that for a large bankruptcy these are very conservative assumptions:
a market with counterparties having large exposures is likely to have more
than 10 well-connected counterparties and, we generally expect trades to
incur temporary impact — which would exacerbate the price extremes.
The risky asset has a price of $50, daily price volatility of $0.95 (equivalent
to a 30% annual return volatility), and trades 5 million units daily. For the
risky asset’s price impact, we have that pi = 2 × 10−6. Risk aversion is a
daily λ = 1 × 10−6. These parameter values are in line with examples in
Almgren and Chriss (2001).
3.1. Small Bankruptcy Example. To see the effect of a small bank-
ruptcy, we consider a market where counterparties hold contracts with ex-
posure standard deviations of $100,000.
In this case, the period 1 price impact is −$0.20 and the period 2 price
impact is −$0.17. The price volatility increases to $1.30 in period 1 and
$1.11 in period 2 . These are equivalent to return volatility increasing from
30% annualized to 41% and 35% annualized.
3.2. Large Bankruptcy Example. To get an idea of what a large financial
bankruptcy looks like, we consider an example for n = 10 counterparties,
each having capital K of $1 million. The counterparties hold contracts
equivalent to OTC contracts with a standard deviation η of (also) $1 million.
We assume the CCP trades ν = 0.5 of the expected rehedge in period 1;
however, for the CCP market structure, the results are not sensitive to ν.
The risky asset has a price of $50 and daily price volatility of $0.95 (equiv-
alent to a 30% annual volatility). For the risky asset’s cash market liquidity,
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we have that pi = 2 × 10−6 and λ = 1 × 10−6. These parameter values are
in line with examples in Almgren and Chriss (2001).
This gives us the plot of follow-on bankruptcy exposure Qˆf due to initial
bankruptcy size Qˆn shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Follow-on bankruptcy exposure Qˆf (left) and
count bˆ (right) versus initial bankruptcy size Qˆn for n = 10
counterparties, each with capital K = $1 million, holding
equivalent contracts with sd(exposure) = $1 million. Line S
is for a bilateral OTC market separating equilibrium where
sellers and buyers trade in different periods. Line P is for
a bilateral OTC market with pooled buying and selling and
overtrading by an amount typical from simulations (1.75×).
Line C is for a market with central clearing.
We first consider the convex hull enclosing the central clearing market line
C and the bilateral OTC market lines P and S. If buyers and sellers in the
bilateral OTC market traded together and split their trades over periods
1 and 2 without trying to profit from one another (as for line P ), their
behavior would yield a line identical to C. However, simulations yielded
an equilibrium where individuals behaved in a way that would yield line P .
Thus we can think of the convex hull generated by lines C, P , and S as the
envelope of distress defining the space of possible distress equilibria.
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Since P results from one equilibrium and S results from another, we can-
not ignore the difference between bilaterally-cleared (OTC) and centrally-
cleared markets. Further, that C lies at the bottom of the envelope makes
clear that distress is more likely and more destructive in markets without a
central counterparty.
We can also note that the expected notional of contracts anulled by follow-
on bankruptcies, Qˆf , is not monotonically increasing for the separating
equilibrium S. This is because the total amount to be rehedged (i.e. in-
cluding Qn) is monotonically increasing; but, for larger bankruptcies, the
initial failure dominates the total annulled exposure. It also suggests that
for mid-sized bankruptcies, the uncertainty about the effect may increase
the expected amount to rehedge; however, for very large bankruptcies the
uncertainty about the net rehedge decreases.
While the separating equilibrium S yields much greater follow-on bank-
ruptcy exposure, it may well yield fewer expected follow-on bankruptcies
than for pooled trading P . This suggests a “boiled frog” scenario: traders
who panic may lose more in total; but, they may slightly increase their
probability of survival. Traders who panic less (trading in periods 1 and
2; line S) incur mark-to-market losses from period 1 trading and incur half
the losses (expectationally) in period 2. In other words, more traders may
find themselves checkmated in period 2. This seeming paradox also lends
support to the possibility of an equilibrium like that of line S.
From a policy perspective, we should consider the sensitivity of follow-on
bankruptcy exposure Qˆf to the initial bankruptcy Qˆn: i.e. ∂Qˆf/∂Qˆn. Fig-
ure 4 shows that both OTC market lines (pooled buyers and sellers, line P ;
separated buyers and sellers, line S) and the central counterparty line (C)
have intervals where they are greater than 1. In these intervals, a counter-
party who could affect the initial bankruptcy size would generate rehedging
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(due to follow-on bankruptcies) in excess of their effect on Qˆn. This suggests
that hunting is more than just an abstract or theoretical concept.
Figure 4. Sensitivity of distress exposure Qˆf (left) and dis-
tress pervasiveness bˆ (right) to an initial bankruptcy of size
Qˆn, i.e. ∂/∂Qˆn. Plot is for n = 10 counterparties each with
capital K = $1 million and positions equivalent to OTC con-
tracts with sd(exposure) = $1 million. Lines C, P , and S
correspond to a market with a central counterparty, pooled
OTC buyers and sellers, and separated buyers and sellers.
This plot suggests that distress (follow-on bankruptcies) are most likely to
be destructive for initial bankruptcies by counterparties having exposure of
$11–$14 million to one risky asset with a capital base of $1 million. While
few firms hold one asset, anecdotal accounts and conditional correlations
from Pesaran and Pesaran (2010) suggest some banks in the credit crisis
saw the correlation of their assets reach levels of 0.7 or more. A correlation
of 0.7 implies we can explain R2 = 0.72 = 0.49 (49%) of the variance. Thus
one risky asset having $11–$14 million of exposure could be thought of as
similarly destructive to assets of $22–$28 million which become correlated
at a level of 0.7. This suggests leverage ratios of 22–28 may be modal levels
at which financial distress occurs. That is especially troubling since most
investment banks have leverage ratios at least this great.
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This suggests that policies which restrict or tax leverage ratios beyond
22 (or so) may reduce distress and volatility externalities — even in mar-
kets with a central counterparty. Another possibility might be to auction
permits to exceed some base leverage ratio and then allow financial compa-
nies to trade these permits (as is done with emissions permits). Aggressive
investments banks with leverage ratios of 30–35 would thus be penalized
relative to banks which earn similar profits on lower leverage.
3.3. Why Complete Networks May Be Fragile. The preceding find-
ings contradict prior work on contagion in financial networks, in particular
Allen and Gale (2000) and Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007).
Those studies note that sparse networks are more fragile and exhibit greater
contagion than complete networks (which they characterize as robust). The
work here differs because the prior studies do not allow for the possibility
of buyer-seller separation.
In Allen and Gale (2000) and Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn
(2007), a sparse (ring) network is compared to a complete network.8 How-
ever, both studies assume complete networks allow for the cost of contagion
to be spread among the other players. This implicitly assumes that all con-
tracts will incur similar losses of exposure when a given counterparty goes
bankrupt. (Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007) make this explicit
by dividing a node’s net exposure among all other counterparties.)
In the complete network analyzed here, broken exposures are not neces-
sarily all of the same sign. This means that some counterparties must buy to
rehedge while others need to sell. It is this division of rehedgers into buyers
8Both Allen and Gale (2000) and Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007) study the
interbank market for which a ring may mimic the lending agreements of banks in different
regions. For financial markets, however, a ring is a highly unlikely market structure.
Neither of these studies considers a central counterparty.
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and sellers that allows them to separate their rehedging intertemporally and
increases the severity of the crisis.
3.4. Real Effects of the Large Bankruptcy Example. We should also
consider some implications for the real effects of an example like this large
bankruptcy. In particular, we consider the effects of an initial bankruptcy
for exposure Qˆn of $10 million.
The effect on the risky asset price is stark. The market with a central
counterparty would see the risky asset drop in price from $50 to roughly
$20 (drop = pi · $15 million = $30). In the bilateral OTC market with
pooled buyers and sellers, the risky asset would drop in price from $50 to
$29 (pi · $15.5 million = $31). However, if buyers and sellers in the bilateral
market separate, the risky asset price will drop from $50 to $10 (pi · $20
million = $40). Thus the risky asset drops in price 33% more than in a
market with a central counterparty.
The increase in volatility would persist for some time as suggested by
most GARCH models. The CCP market would see volatility increase due
to the period 1 return of -60%. The bilateral market with pooled buyers
and sellers would see intraday volatility increase from 30% (annualized) to
328% plus an effect from the period 1 (daily) return of -62%. The bilateral
market with self-separated buyers and sellers would see intraday volatility
increase from 30% (annualized) to 596% plus an effect from the period 1
(daily) return of -80%. Using an average persistence of 0.98 for variances
from Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), we can get the excess volatilities
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= 2.66 = 266%.(24)
For an average risk aversion of λ¯ = 3 and a market size of 2(Qˆn +
Qˆf |Qˆn, s) = 2($10 + $10) million = $40 million, this implies an externality
distress cost of λ¯
σ˜2CCP
2 × $40 million = $3.2 million for the CCP market.
Compare this to the externality cost of distress for the bilateral OTC mar-
ket with pooled buyers and sellers of $123 million. Worst is the externality
cost of distress for the bilateral market with segregated buyers and sellers:
$425 million. Thus we can estimate that, for this market, the marginal ex-
ternality cost of distress due to market structure is at least $120 million and
perhaps as much as $425− $3 = $422 million (3 to 11 times the size of the
market). Obviously, these results would be even more disturbing if scaled
up to sizes of markets which experienced recent distress. For a CDS market
with $2.6 trillion of net exposure (as per Phillips (2010)), this would imply
an externality cost of distress of up to $28.6 trillion. It is worth noting that
current figures for the cost of the financial crisis are of the same order of
magnitude.
These figures are only part of the story, however. If the externality cost
of volatility exceeds the benfit of trading in a market, we can expect that
market to cease trading. Although the model used here presumes all players
continue to trade, we can use the model-implied volatility effects to reveal
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when markets fail. Obviously, the distress from such failure would exceed
that predicted by the model.
A drop in allocative efficiency is another effect of systemic crisis. In the
pre-crisis state, the average investor (λ¯ = 3) assuming an 8% equity pre-
mium and the previously-mentioned 30% volatility would hold a portfolio
with 8%
λ¯σ2
= 30% in the risky asset. Post-crisis, an investor in the CCP mar-
ket would hold 8%
λ¯(σ˜2CCP+σ
2)
= 18.5% in the risky asset; an investor in the
bilateral OTC market with pooled buyers and sellers would hold 1.2% in
the risky asset; and, an investor in the bilateral OTC market with segre-
gated buyers and sellers would hold only 0.4% of their portfolio the risky
asset. If we believe holding 30% in the risky asset is allocatively efficient,
then crises have a real inefficiency cost by suggesting to investors that they
pay transactions costs to diverge (perhaps temporarily) from their pre-crisis
holdings. Even if we say that market structure risk matters and view all of
these holdings as allocatively efficient, we should still be surprised by dif-
ferent market structures suggesting holding anywhere from 18.5% to 0.4%
of the risky asset post-crisis. This would also seem to suggest that bilateral
OTC markets take longer to recover from crises since investors are more
dissuaded from holding risky assets after a bilateral market crisis.
While few markets consists of only ten firms, many are dominated by
about ten large intermediaries. In this case, a systemic crisis created by the
bankruptcy of one intermediary would be serious. Further, the sensitivity of
distress pervasiveness (Figure 4) suggests we could easily expect 2–3 follow-
on bankruptcies of such large intermediaries after a decline of $1 MM/$15
MM = roughly 7% in the value of all leveraged positions. Again, while we
cannot easily equate this model with the recent financial crisis, we can note
that after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy that Bank of America, Citigroup,
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and Goldman Sachs were thought to be near bankruptcy. Thus this model
does not disagree with recently observed effects.
Recent averages from Harper (2010) suggest such intermediaries (large
investment banks) each pay an average of $16.4 billion in compensation per
year and employ 134,000 people. Three bankruptcies (a major systemic
crisis) would unemploy about 400,000 employees and, assuming one year of
unemployment and 40% overall taxes, a loss of $19.7 billion in tax revenues.
Further costs would include unemployment benefits.
Moreover, these firms are not useless: they exist to do more than just
pay their employees. These firms provide services necessary for the smooth
functioning of capital markets and the macroeconomy. While the effects of
a crisis due to impairment of these firms may be more difficult to estimate,
we know that the effects are serious. Bernanke (1983) notes that such crises
may affect market making and information-gathering services provided by
these firms. That in turn reduces the efficiency of the financial sector and
may lead to expensive credit, economic contraction, and even depression.
4. Conclusion
We have shown that different network structures of exposures and mark-
to-market payments can yield different market effects when an exogenous
shock is introduced and trades have price impact. These effects are apart
from any concerns about adverse selection and are due strictly to market
structure.
The bankruptcy of a small non-financial firm increases the volatility of
a risky asset held by the failed firm. Further, we can model this increased
volatility as a function of exposures to the failed counterparty and market
impact parameters.
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The bankruptcy of a large financial firm is shown to be more destructive:
counterparties may be checkmated (unable to avoid expected bankruptcy),
and counterparties may hunt the weak (seek to bankrupt counterparties) for
positive expected profit. Thus counterparty risk becomes transmuted into
systemic risk. In the extreme case, buyers and sellers may separate when
they trade, causing greatly increased follow-on bankruptcies, market swings,
and volatility. This reduces market liquidity and could therefore touch of
a vicious cycle of reducing funding and market liquidities as suggested by
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). This also suggests that complete net-
works have more potential for contagion than star networks and other sparse
networks — a result counter to Allen and Gale (2000) and Nier, Yang, Yorul-
mazer, and Alentorn (2007).
Both of these cases, small and large bankruptcies, have policy implications
for market structures. In the large bankruptcy case, one example suggests
that leverage ratios in the mid-20’s may be modal for distress and may cause
the most destruction relative to the size of the initial bankruptcy. This is
especially troubling since many investment banks have leverage ratios in the
20’s to low 30’s. Further, the number of bankruptcies implied by the model
allows us to guess at the unemployment caused by distress and the resulting
loss in tax revenues.
These models also show that distress and rehedging leads to increased
volatility. This increased volatility is clearly an externality. Using an ag-
gregate risk-aversion parameter, that externality may be priced to estimate
the cost of differing market structures under stress. The increased volatility
may lead investors to expend effort and cash to rebalance their portfolios
and creates allocative inefficiencies. Further, extreme volatility may pose
such high externality costs that markets cease to function.
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The results also suggest there is a benefit to trading on centrally-cleared
(and perhaps even exchange-traded) markets versus bilaterally-cleared OTC
markets. However, bilateral markets have small startup costs and are thus
important for financial innovation. If we could price the evolution of that
flexibility, we might know more about when to offer incentives for trading
to migrate from bilaterally-cleared to centrally-cleared markets. Given that
the recently-passed Dodd-Frank financial reform bill encourages such tran-
sitions, these findings may help policymakers determine when is the best
time to move markets to central clearing.
While monitoring exposures and capital levels is critical, it is not enough.
The models here show the value of monitoring the distribution of exposures,
how many players are in a network, and how connected the network is.
Obviously, this suggests a need for more financial transaction reporting.
However, whether such reporting will result from Dodd-Frank (via central
clearing of derivatives or formal reporting) is not yet clear.
We also see that the follow-on distress pervasiveness bˆ and exposure Qˆf
are useful metrics for how destructive a crisis might be and that their sensi-
tivities ∂bˆ/∂Qn and ∂Qˆf/∂Qn are useful metrics of market fragility. When
∂Qˆf/∂Qn > 1, we should expect to see checkmate and hunting.
Hunting poses a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation: counterparties hurt them-
selves by rehedging to avoid losses from other rehedgers. This suggests a
reason for concerted action by market authorities in times of severe dis-
tress. One could view the Federal Reserve’s forcing 15 banks to collectively
takeover LTCM as such an action.
This model can be extended to further study counterparty and systemic
risks. Various fixes could be explored to the unsatisfactory assumption that
all trading occurs with an external counterparty outside the network. In
particular, we should study the marginal effect of adding a market maker
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concerned about adverse selection or even counterparty risk when trading;
and, we might consider analyzing other network structures and other net-
work metrics (such as minimum spanning trees). We should explore the
possibilities of counterparties trading collusively to trigger mark-to-market
profits or counterparties’ risk aversions changing when contagion occurs. We
could also examine the efficiency of capital usage if the CCP were endowed
with capital aside from having claims on members’ assets.9
Finally, we should consider how traders would react to these differing net-
work structures. Given the differences in systemic risk and, possibly, capital
charges (if we were to mimic how CCPs require posting margin), would the
networks of exposures be the same, similar, or very different?10 This would
require us to model network formation and to allow counterparties to enter
the network endogenously. The results here lack that endogeneity because
it is not necessary to study how market structures affect distress. While
network formation would rest on the results developed here, it is sufficiently
important to be an area of further study.
Appendix A. Large Market-Induced Bankruptcy Derivations
A.1. Expected Exposure for First Bankruptcy. We assume the Qi are
normally distributed and use the Gumbel extreme value distribution for the
9Recent work by Biais, Heider, and Hoerova (2011) suggests that a CCP is capital efficient;
however, that work is ongoing.
10I thank both Tim Johnson and Florian Heider for noting this important question.
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maximum (Qn) distribution. Since the Qi’s are iid we have
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, and11 dn =
√





The integral of u over the partial domain of the Gumbel distribution




















= γ − ae−e−a + E1(e−a)(30)












11The arctangent function is used to preserve pi for the permanent impact parameter. A
single appearance of a transcendental number should not curtail a convenient consonance.
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This then gives us
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A.2. Exposure to Follow-On Bankruptcies. The number of follow-on
bankruptcies b has expectation bˆ = E(b|K +Qnr0 ≤ 0) of:













, and φ,Φ are the standard normal pdf and
cdf. The bounds κ1 and κ2 are assumed to be of the same sign — which fails
if the direction of aggregate trading is opposite that needed for aggregate
rehedging. This situation is ignored since such trading would be suboptimal.
We also have that the expected exposure of a bankrupted counterparty is
E(Q|K +Qnr0 ≤ 0) =
η
√




The additional unwanted exposure, Qˆf = E(Qf |K + Qnr0 ≤ 0), due to
follow-on bankruptcies then follows from integration by parts and Wald’s
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Formula:






















A.3. Expectation of Minimum Price. To find the maximum amount
sold, we note that each trade is normally-distributed in size. Also, the
order of trading is random, i.e. uniformly distributed across the (n − 1)!
different permutations. Let x′i be the i-th trade, or x
′
i = xρ(i) if ρ is a




i, Sn = minn′∈{1,...,n} Sn′ ,
and Sn = maxn′∈{1,...,n} Sn′ .
Since the beginning and ending positions are constrained, we model the
sum of trades Sn as a Brownian bridge and use time inversion to handle
our ending position. Starting from Karatzas and Shreve (1991), equation
(4.3.40), we get
(42) P (Sn−1 ≥ m|Sn−1 = Qˆn + Qˆf ) = e−2
m(m−(Qˆn+Qˆf ))
(n−1)η2 .
Integrating this gives us the expected exceedance of the high beyond an
ending trade of Qˆn+Qˆf . (This is the opposite of what we are doing; but, the
development here eases comparison with Karatzas and Shreve’s formula.)
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Thus we have that
















































This implies, via symmetry, that
E(Sn−1|Sn−1 = −(Qˆn + Qˆf )) =



















(n− 1)η(r0 + pi(xi + yˆi))2(50)





















For mathematical ease, we assumed Qn > 0 and r0 < 0; rehedgers must
sell to recreate canceled positions. Thus the sign of the bˆ derivatives makes
sense: more selling increases the expected number of follow-on bankruptcies.
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ηΦ(κ1)(r0 + pi(xi + yˆi))3
.(56)
Since r0 < 0, these derivatives are negative. Thus more selling will increase
the total exposure cancelled by follow-on bankruptcies.
Finally, we can differentiate player i’s expected utility function with re-
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Then we differentiate the expected other players’ utility with respect to
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A.5. Expectation of One-Sided Trade Quantities. We start with the
idea of finding the expected sell trades after rehedging a large bankruptcy








xi = Q¯ < 0)(59)
where xi is the amount traded by counterparty i in period 1 and Q¯ is the
amount which would be rehedged if buyer and seller both traded anticipating
bankruptcies.








xi = Q¯ < 0).(60)
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